Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 4

1999

United States v. Navistar Inernational Transportation Corp.:
Seventh Circuit Bars Government's CERCLA Claim Based on
Violation of the Statute of Limitations
Brock Elliot Czeschin

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brock E. Czeschin, United States v. Navistar Inernational Transportation Corp.: Seventh Circuit Bars
Government's CERCLA Claim Based on Violation of the Statute of Limitations, 10 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 399
(1999).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/4

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

1999]

Czeschin: United States v. Navistar Inernational Transportation Corp.: Seve
UNITED STATES v. NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION CORP.: SEVENTH CIRCUIT BARS
GOVERNMENT'S CERCLA CLAIM BASED ON
VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

"What a diffrence a day makes . .. twenty-four little hours. ,,

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in an effort
to protect the public health and environment from the dangers associated with hazardous waste sites.2 Although the statute provided
that those responsible for contaminating the environment would be
held liable for the clean-up of hazardous waste, CERCA also recognized the importance of prompt resolution of liability regarding
1. United States v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 152 F.3d 702, 715 (7th Cir.
1998), (Evans, J., dissenting) (quoting DINAH WASHINGTON, What a Difference a Day
Makes, on VERVE (GSS Records 1959)), reh'g denied, No. 97-3829, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27878 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 1998).
2. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. The Ninety-Sixth Congress
passed CERCLA and President Carter signed the Act into law on December 11,
1980. See United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552, 1554 (D.N.M.
1992) (outlining brief history of CERCLA's enactment). Congress enacted the
statute, known commonly as "Superfund" or CERCLA, in response to a number of
environmental disasters which occurred at abandoned hazardous waste dumpsites
during the 1970s. See CHRISTINA M. VALENTE & WILLIAM D. VALENTE, INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 195 (1995) (stating immediate "impetus"

for CERCLA legislation was "very real specter of hazardous substances leaching
from abandoned dumpsites and contaminating the land on which people live and
the water they drink"). In 1986, Congress enacted a series of amendments, known
as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), to correct perceived inadequacies in the CERCLA framework. See id. at 196. For more information on SARA, see infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
CERCLA provides for the identification of sites where hazardous substances
have been released, or where such releases are likely to occur. See VALENTE & VALENTE, supra, at 195. Once identified, the government, or a private party which has
assumed the responsibility, will clean-up the site. See id. Finally, if the government
conducted the clean-up, the government may seek recovery of the cost it incurred
during the clean-up from those who are responsible for the contamination. See id.
If a private party undertook the clean-up, that party may then seek contribution or
cost recovery from other potentially responsible parties. See id.
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the clean-ups.3 Therefore, Congress incorporated statutes of limitations into the CERCLA framework to encourage the government to
4
bring timely actions against potentially liable parties.
Courts have often had difficulty interpreting CERCLA's complex statutes of limitations. 5 Specifically, courts have struggled with
balancing the policy of ensuring expeditious resolution of claims
with the desire to hold accountable those who caused the contamination. 6 To aid in the task of interpreting CERCLA, courts have
relied upon the rule of statutory construction under which statutes
of limitations, when applied against the government, are to be con7
strued strictly in the government's favor.
3. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 20 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3043. For further discussion of the policy supporting prompt government
action regarding CERCLA, see infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text.
4. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Star. 1613 (1986). The statutes of limitations
were incorporated into CERCLA through SARA. See also Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that prior to enactment of
SARA, Congress intended government to be able to bring cost recovery actions at
any time); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 909-10 (D.N.H. 1985) (noting lack of time restrictions on government suits prior to amendments). For a
more complete discussion of Congress's intent in adopting these amendments, see
infra notes 24 and 72, and accompanying text.
5. See Recent Cases, Court ReJects CERCLA Cost Recovery Claim, 4 N.C. ENvrL. L.
LETTER 3 (1998) ("CERC[A was cobbled together and hastily enacted during a
lame-duck session of Congress .... Since 1981, federal judges, government lawyers, and private-sector legal advisors have strained to make sense of [CERCLA's
provisions]....
The confusion generated by CERCLA extends to its statute of
limitations."); see also Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842
(6th Cir. 1994) (illustrating court's difficulty interpreting CERCLA's statute of limitations). The Kelley court concluded that the CERCLA statutes of limitations were
ambiguous. See id. at 842. The Kelley court stated that "[o]bviously if the meaning
of the statutory language was as clear as either party maintains, the two sides could
not have arrived at such contrary interpretations of it." Id.
6. See Kelley, 17 F.3d at 842-43 (recognizing conflict between United States
Supreme Court opinions favoring application of statutes of limitations with rule
that courts strictly construe statutes in favor of government); United States v.
United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552, 1561-63 (D.N.M. 1992) (addressing conflict of policies and concluding court should construe statute of limitations in favor
of government).
7. See Kelley, 17 F.3d at 842-44 (concluding district court properly relied upon
statutory rule of construction); United States v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 990 F.
Supp. 897, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1998) ("The [CERCLA] statutes should be interpreted
with the United States Supreme Court's frequent admonition to strictly construe
statutes of limitation in favor of the Government where application of them might
otherwise bar its rights."); United Nuclear, 814 F. Supp. at 1561 (stating "[c]ourts
have interpreted the [CERCLA] statute of limitations liberally in favor of EPA");
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (stating "whenever a defendant seeks to apply a statute of limitation in order
to bar a governmental action, the statute of limitation must be strictly construed in
favor of the government") (citing Moltolo, 605 F. Supp. at 902); United States v.
Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Va. 1988) (citing rule as "statutes of limitation

sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government must be strictly construed in
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Recently, the Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Navistar International TransportationCorp.,8 confronted the issue of whether CERCLA's statute of limitations barred the government's cost recovery
claim for an initial remedial action. 9 The Navistar decision focused
primarily on which of CERCLA's statutes of limitations applied and
what actions were sufficient to trigger the relevant statute. 10 The
Seventh Circuit, unlike the majority of courts, rejected the rule in
favor of construing statutes of limitations to the advantage of the
government, and held that the federal government missed the applicable statutory period by a single day.1"
This Note discusses the Seventh Circuit's holding in relation to
other judicial opinions addressing similar statute of limitations issues under CERCLA. Part II summarizes the law's development in
this area prior to the Navistar decision.' 2 Part III explains the facts
giving rise to the Navistar case.' 3 Part -V describes the Navistar
court's reasoning in reaching its decision. 14 Part V presents a critical analysis of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and decision.1 5 Finally, Part VI discusses the negative consequences which the
holding may potentially have on future assignments of CERCLA
liability.16
favor of the Government") (citation omitted). For a more complete discussion of
the courts' use of the statutory rule of construction in CERCLA cases, see infra
notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
8. 152 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 1998), rehg denied, No. 97-3829, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 27878 (7th Cir. Oct. 16, 1998).
9. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 704. For a discussion of the facts leading up to the
Seventh Circuit's hearing of the Navistarcase, see infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text. For a more complete discussion of the Navistar court's decision and
reasoning, see infra notes 102-35 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of
the Navistar court's opinion and its potential impact on environmental law, see
infra notes 136-63 and accompanying text.
10. See id. at 706-14. For a discussion of the Navistar court's reasoning in determining which statute of limitations applied, see infra notes 107-22 and accompanying text. For a discussion of which actions the Navistar court held sufficient to
trigger the statute of limitations, see infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
11. See id. at 714. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in rejecting the statutory rule of construction, see infra notes 103-06 and accompanying
text.
12. For a summary of the relevant law prior to the Navistar opinion, see infra
notes 17-82 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the factual events giving rise to the Navistar case, see
infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
14. For a narrative analysis of the Navistar court's reasoning, see infra notes
102-35 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical analysis of the Navistar court's reasoning, see infra notes 13649 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact which the Navistar opinion may have on
this area of law, see infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
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BACKGROUND

Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations set forth a period of time during which

claimants must bring particular legal actions.1 7 After the statutory
period has elapsed, a claimant is precluded from bringing the action, regardless of its merit.1 8 Modem courts tend to favor statute

of limitations defenses when asserted against private parties, construing the statutes liberally in the interest of giving them effect. 19
This favorable view of limitation defenses, however, does not apply

when employed against the federal government. 20 The government is generally not subject to statutes of limitations absent con-

gressional intent to the contrary. 2 1 Even when Congress does
17. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (holding that statutes of limitations are legislative judgments announcing thatjustice requires adversaries be put on notice). Long before the first statutes of limitations were written,
courts recognized the notion that a long lapse of time precludes a claimant from
pursuing an action upon a right. See 51 AM.JUR. 2D Limitation ofActions § 1 (1970).
Today, however, legislatures routinely incorporate express periods of limitations
into their enactments. See id. § 9.
18. See id. § 27 (1970); see also Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211,
228 (1995) (holding court ruling upon statute of limitations grounds is ruling on
merits). In SpendthriftFarm, the United States Supreme Court stated "[t] he rules of
finality, both statutory and judge-made, treat dismissal on statute-of-limitations
grounds . . . as a judgment on the merits." Id. at 228. See also FED. R. CIv. P.
41 (b) (stating any involuntary dismissal of claim, other than dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue or failure to join party, "operates as an adjudication
upon the merits").
19. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 3 (1970); see also New Castle
County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 903 F. Supp. 771, 780 (D. Del. 1995) (demonstrating court's willingness to construe CERCLA statute of limitations liberally,
thereby giving it effect in private contribution action).
20. See generally 51 Am. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 50 (1970) (stating that
"the judicial attitude is in favor of statutes of limitation . . . since they are considered as statutes of repose and as affording security against stale claims. Consequently, except in the case of statutes of limitation against the government, the
courts are inclined to construe limitation laws liberally.").
21. See Bowers v. New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 349 (1927)
(stating "[u]ndoubtedly the United States will not be held barred by a general
statute of limitation"); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462
(1924) (holding action by United States in governmental capacity is not subject to
time limitation absent contrary congressional enactment); see also United States v.
Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940) (holding federal government generally not
bound by state statutes of limitations). The courts' reluctance to hold the government subject to statute of limitations defenses derives from the common law
maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, or "time does not run against the king." See Susan Lillian Holdsclaw, Note, Reviving a Double Standard in Statutes of Limitations and
Repose: Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co., 71 N.C. L. REv.
879, 879 & n.6 (1993) (providing thorough history of common law rule and effects
of rule on modern law of North Carolina).
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consent to being bound by a statute of limitations, courts will gener22
ally construe the statute in favor of the government.
B.

CERCLA's Statutes of Limitations
1. Statutory Provisions

A series of amendments to CERCLA, known as the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), was adopted by
Congress in 1986.23 SARA added a number of statutes of limita-

tions to CERCLA that control when the government or private persons must bring suit for the various types of actions available under
the statute. 24 Prior to the enactment of SARA, there were no time
restrictions placed upon the government's authority to bring many
types of CERCLA actions. 25 This Note will address the statutes of
22. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984) (stating, "[t]his
Court long ago pronounced the standard: 'Statutes of limitation sought to be applied to bar the rights of the Government, must receive a strict construction in
favor of the Government"') (quoting E.L DuPont de Nemours & Co., 264 U.S. at
462); Independent Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 640, 650 (1927)
(stating "[s] tatutes of limitation against the United States are to be narrowly construed") (citation omitted); Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855
F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating, "6-year statute of limitations on actions
against the United States is ajurisdictional requirement attached by Congress as a
condition of the government's waiver of sovereign immunity and, as such, must be
strictly construed"). Courts have applied this rule of construction in the context of
environmental litigation, as well as other areas of law. See, e.g., United States v.
Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (limiting applicability of statute of limitations against government when government acts as sovereign); Rosette
Inc. v. United States, 141 F.3d 1394, 1397 (10th Cir. 1998) (construing Quiet Tide
Act's statute of limitations in favor of United States); California v. Montrose Chem.
Corp., 104 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1997) (construing statutes of limitations
strictly in favor of government).
23. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
Enenco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1993) (noting that SARA became effective
on October 17, 1986).
24. See Stephen D. Ramsey & Maureen M. Crough, The Superfund Amendments
and Reathorization Act of 1986, in ENVrL. L. 29, 39 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study,
Feb. 1988) (providing overview of SARA's effect on CERCLA, including statutes of
limitations); see also Vesico4 9 F.3d at 528. The Velsicol court noted that "[b]y passing SARA, 'Congress sought to better define cleanup standards, to expand resources available to EPA for investigations and cleanups, to clarify EPA's authority
under Superfund law, and to expand and clarify the states' role in any remedial
action undertaken, or ordered, by EPA.'" Id. at 528 n.3 (quoting United States v.
Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.2d 1409, 1417 (6th Cir. 1991)).
For a discussion of the House Committee reports discussing the passage of the
statutes of limitations within SARA, see infra note 72 and accompanying text.

25. See ALLEN J.

TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 5.10 (1992) (explaining new SARA statutes of limitations under section
113(g) (2) and their effects on litigation); see, e.g., Velsico4 9 F.3d at 528 (stating,
"[a]s originally enacted in December 1980, CERCLA did not have a statute of limitations governing a cost recovery action under section 107(a)").

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

5

Villanova Environmental
Law Journal, Vol.
10,JouRNAL
Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4[Vol.
VILLANovA
ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw

404

X: p. 399

limitations related to cost recovery claims under CERCLA section

113(g)

(2).26

Section 113 (g) (2) divides cost recovery claims, available under
section 107(a), into removal actions and remedial actions. 2 7 Remedial actions are further divided into initial remedial actions and
subsequent remedial actions. 28 Under CERCLA, a cost recovery
claim falling within the "removal" category is understood as "the
clean-up or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment." 29 The definition of a "remedial" action under CERCIA includes "those actions consistent with [the] permanent
remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions. '30 CERCLA does not define the two types of remedial actions - initial and
subsequent - found within the statute of limitations.
Generally, a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to
accrue "after completion," governs removal actions.3 1 Claimants
26. See CERCLA §

11 3

(g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 96 1 3(g) (2).

27. See id. For the relevant text of section l13(g) (2), see infra notes 31-33.

28. See id.
29. Id. § 101(23), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23). CERCLA defines the terms "remove"
or "removal" as:
[T] he cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the
threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment .... or the
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or
mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.
Id.
30. Id. § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). The statute defines "remedy" or "remedial action" as:
[T] hose actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in
addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize
the release of hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause
substantial danger to present or future public health or welfare or the
environment. This term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at
the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection
using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes,
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision
of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment.
Id. (emphasis added).
31. See CERCLA § 11 3 (g)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 9 6 13 (g) (2). The statute provides:
An initial action for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 of
this title must be commenced(A) for a removal action, within 3 years after completion of the removal action, except that such recovery action must be brought
within 6 years after a determination to grant a waiver under sec-
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must bring claims for initial remedial actions within six years "after
32
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action."
The government may bring a subsequent remedial claim "any time
during the response action, but [such a claim] must be commenced
no later than 3 years after the date of completion of all response
33
action."

2.

Case Law Concerning CERCLA's Statute of Limitationsfor
Recovery of Costs.
a. Distinguishing"Initial"and "Subsequent" Actions.

Whether an action for the recovery of costs is characterized as
"initial" or "subsequent" dictates which period of limitations will apply under section 113(g) (2) (B) of CERCLA.3 4 Courts, however,
have been unable to reach a clear consensus regarding which actions are properly deemed "initial" or "subsequent" under the
35
statute.
tion 9604(c)(1)(C) of this title for continued response action
Id. (emphasis added).
32. CERCLA § 11 3 (g) (2); 42 U.S.C. § 96 1 3(g)(2). The statute provides:
An initialaction for recovery of the costs referred to in section 9607 of this
title must be commenced(B) for a remedial action, within 6 years after initiation of physical on-site
construction of the remedial action, except that, if the remedial action is
initiated within 3 years after the completion of the removal action, costs
incurred in the removal action may be recovered in the cost recovery
action brought under this subparagraph.
Id. (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 11 3(g) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(2). The statute states:
In any such action described in this subsection, the court shall enter a
declaratory judgment on liability for response costs or damages that will
be binding on any subsequent action or actions to recover further response costs or damages. A subsequent action or actions under section
9607 of this title for further response costs at the vessel or facility may be
maintained at any time during the response action, but must be commenced no later than 3 years after the date of completion of all response
action.
Id.
34. See id.
35. Compare Beazer East, Inc. v. United States Navy, No. 96-1736, 1997 WL

173225 (4th Cir. Apr. 11, 1997) (unpublished disposition) (holding declaratory
judgment to be prerequisite to subsequent action); Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 844 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating declaratory order is
"mandatory" for subsequent action); and In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 951 F.2d 246,
250 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding declaratory judgment proper means of assigning
CERCLA liability), with Navistar,152 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding declaratory judgment not prerequisite of subsequent action). See generally Holly Warshauer, CERCLA's Statute of Limitations Gets More Confusing, 7 IND. ENVTL.
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While courts have had little difficulty interpreting the term "initial," problems arise when a party, involved in an earlier cost recovery action, becomes involved in further cost recovery actions but in
a different litigation position.3 6 The dispute centers on whether
the latter actions are deemed "subsequent" or, due to the change in
37
litigation position, are characterized as further "initial" actions.
A common interpretation of section 113 (g) (2) is that, as a prerequisite to any "subsequent" action, a court must have previously
entered a declaratory judgment assigning liability to the party
against whom relief is sought in the action.3 8 Both the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits appear to follow this view.3 9 Furthermore, this construction receives support from the statute's legislative history40 as
41
well as unadopted Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rules.
4 (1997) (presenting critical analysis of distinction between
initial and subsequent actions as formulated by district court in Navistar).
36. See Beazer, 1997 WL 173225, at *1. In Beazer, the problem arose when the
plaintiff moved to dismiss its first cost recovery claim against the defendant, but
wanted to maintain a second cost recovery claim against that same defendant. See
id. A similar situation existed in Navistar the government sought to bring suit
directly against parties who had been third-party defendants in an earlier action.
COMPLIANCE UPDATE

See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705-06.

37. See Beazer, 1997 WL 173225, at *2 (declining to find action "subsequent"
and barring action under res judicata); Navistar, 152 F.3d at 708-09 (concluding
action was "initial").
38. See Beazer, 1997 WL 173225, at *2 (holding section l13(g) (2) requires declaratory order regarding liability before subsequent action may be brought); KelLey, 17 F.3d at 844 (stating that under section 113 (g) (2) "[t]he entry of declaratory
judgment as to liability is mandatory") (citing United States v. Kramer, 757 F.
Supp. 397, 412 (D.N.J. 1991)); see also In re Dant & Russel, 951 F.2d at 249-50
(explaining benefits of obtaining declaratory judgment before recovery action).
39. See Beazer, 1997 WL 173225, at *2 ("As the Navy points out, however,
Beazer's interpretation ignores the first sentence of [section 9613(g)(2)(B) 2],
which requires that the court enter a declaratory judgment as to liability 'that will
be binding on any subsequent action."'); Kelley, 17 F.3d at 844 (stating, "entry of
declaratory judgment as to liability is mandatory [for a subsequent action]") (citing United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 412 (D.N.J. 1991); see also United
States v. Atlas Minerals & Chemicals, Inc., No. CIV.A.91-5118, 1995 WL 510304, at
*107 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1995) (entering declaratory judgment binding on third
party plaintiffs' recovery from third party defendants in subsequent actions);
Kramer, 757 F. Supp. at 437 (noting that while government "may not recover costs
not yet incurred, it may obtain a declaratory judgment pursuant to section 113
(g)(2)").
40. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038

(stating "[i]n the initial cost recovery action, in order to conserve judicial time and
resources, the court is to enter a declaratory judgment on liability for response
costs; this judgment will be binding in future cost recovery actions to obtain additional costs").
41. See 57 C.F.R. §§ 34.742, 34.752 (1992) (stating "[u]nder the provisions of
section 113(g) (2) (B), where a declaratory judgment on liability has been entered
by a court, the statutory limitation period for a subsequent action is extended to
three years after 'completion of all response action'").
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A far less common interpretation rejects this narrow reading of
the statutory language and advocates a more liberal definition of
the term "subsequent. ' 42 This argument suggests that the statutory
language does not create a prerequisite for subsequent actions, and
that means other than a declaratory order may accomplish the pol43
icy objectives cited in the legislative history.
b.

Actions That Trigger the Statute of Limitations
for Initial Actions

According to section 113 of CERCLA, the statute of limitations
for an "initial remedial action" begins to run six years after "initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action. ' 44 The
District Court for the Eastern District of California, in California v.
Hyampom Lumber Co., 4 5 set forth the test for determining what actions serve to trigger the statute of limitations for initial remedial
actions. 46 The Hyampom Lumber court stated that the relevant event
must possess four attributes; namely it must: 1) be "physical"; 2)
have occurred "on-site"; 3) be part of the "construction of the remedial action"; and 4) constitute the "initiation" of the remedial action. 4 7 These requirements track the language of the statute and
48
appear to accord with its plain meaning.
Other courts, however, have either suggested that the Hyampom
Lumber test is not comprehensive, or have appeared to determine
whether an act triggers the statute of limitations without applying
42. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 709 (adopting view that declaratory judgment is
not prerequisite to subsequent action). For a critical discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's holding, in this context, as against the clear weight of authority, see infra
note 110.
43. See id. at 710.
44. CERCLA § 113(g) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (g) (2) (B). For a complete discussion of the CERCLA provisions related to the statutes of limitation for removal
and remedial actions, see supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
45. 903 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Cal. 1995).
46. See id. at 1391. In Hyampom Lumber, the defendants operated a lumber
mill which treated lumber by dipping it into a chemical solution. See id. at 1390.
As a result of spillage and seepage from the dip tanks, the government discovered
"widespread contamination" of the soil. See id. The State of California sought recovery under CERCLA for costs incurred as a result of cleaning-up the defendant's
lumber mill site. See id. The defendants opposed the action on the grounds that it
was time barred by CERCLA section 113(g)(2)(B). See id. The district court, reasoning that section 11 3 (g) (2) (B) is "unambiguous," accepted the defendant's interpretation of the statute and refused to apply the rule that statutes of limitation
should be construed in favor of the government. See id. at 1393. But see Kelley, 17
F.3d at 842-44 (holding that section 113(g) (2) (A) is ambiguous).
47. Hyampom Lumber, 903 F. Supp. at 1391.
48. See id. (noting that court begins with statutory language). For the text of
CERCLA section 11 3 (g) (2) (B), see supra note 32.
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any clear test. 49 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in United States v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc.,50 used a variation of
the Hyampom Lumber approach, reasoning that "[n] othing in Hyampom Lumber. .. prohibits additional requirements from being
considered."5 1 The Akzo court added a fifth requirement which
provides that the event constitute a "critical role in implementation
52
of the permanent remedy."
The Akzo court's modification of the Hyampom Lumber test produced wide disparity between the respective courts' decisions regarding what actions were sufficient to trigger the statute of
limitations. 53 The Hyampom Lumber court held that installation of
water and electric utilities at the site initiated the tolling of the statute of limitations. 54 Conversely, the Akzo court held that the con49. See, e.g., United States v. Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 897, 905
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (adding additional requirement to Hyampom Lumber test);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1035, 1042 (S.D. Ga. 1994)
(declining to apply any clear test).
50. 990 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Mich. 1998).
51. Id. at 905. In Akzo, the federal government brought a cost recovery action
against numerous potentially liable parties in connection with the clean-up of a
Michigan landfill. See id. at 899. The Akzo court characterized the clean-up as a
"remedial action" to which section 1l13(g) (2) (B)'s six year statute of limitations
applied. See id. at 904. Without concluding whether the statute was ambiguous,
the Akzo court asserted that it should interpret section 113 in accordance with the
rule that statutes of limitations be construed in favor of the government. See id.
52. Id. The Akzo court stated that the Hyampom Lumber test "establishes a
floor, meaning an event must at least meet these criteria to be considered the
initiation of physical on-site construction." Id. The Akzo court concluded both
that the additional requirement, that the action "play a critical role in implementing the permanent remedy," did not violate the Hyampom Lumber opinion, and that
the Hyampom Lumber decision itself implicitly applied this fifth requirement Id.
The Akzo court based this conclusion on a statement by the Hyampom Lumber court
that "the utilities played a critical role in the implementation of the permanent
remedy." Hyampom Lumber, 903 F. Supp. at 1393; see also Navistar, 152 F.3d at 712-

13 (explaining governments' reliance on Akzo opinion in Navistar case).
53. See Akzo, 990 F. Supp. at 905-06 (describing actions court held insufficient
to trigger statute of limitations); Hyampom Lumber, 903 F. Supp. at 1393-94 (describing action held sufficient to trigger statute of limitations). For the language of the
courts' opinions depicting these actions, see infra notes 54 and 55.
54. See Hyampom Lumber, 903 F. Supp. at 1393-94. The actual work which triggered the statute of limitations was described by the court as follows:
[A] subcontractor installed a twenty foot lumber pole and necessary electrical hardware and ran a power line into an office building at the site.
Over the following few days, the same subcontractor installed new pipes
which provided water to the site from a nearby pond. Both the water and
the electricity were installed temporarily to be used only for the duration
of the State's response action. Phone service was also connected at this
time.
Id. at 1391.
The court further explained why these actions served to trigger the statute of
limitations as follows:

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol10/iss2/4

10

1999]

Czeschin:
United
States v. Navistar Inernational
Transportation Corp.:
NAVISTAR
INTERNATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION
Co. Seve 409

struction of staging/storage pads, the excavation of approximately
235 drums from the site and the hookup of both utilities and sanita55
tion services was not sufficient to begin the statutory period.
Alternatively, the District Court for the Southern District of
Georgia, in Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp.,56 simply relied on
the statute's "ordinary meaning" in deciding the issue and did not
adhere to any clear test.5 7 Noting the existence of minimal judicial
guidance on this point, the Union Carbidecourt determined that the
building of a steel fence, intended to keep animals out of the site in
[T] he installation of the utilities was "remedial" rather than a "removal"
action. The installation of the utilities was also part of the "construction
of the remedial action." It is undisputed that the utility pole and the
water lines were installed for the sole purpose of providing power and
water to the Jensen site during the implementation of the permanent
remedy. Moreover, water and power were central to various aspects of
the remedy, including fire control, dust suppression, steam cleaning, and
lighting.
Finally, since the installation of the utilities was the first step taken in
implementing the remedy, it marked the "initiation" of the remedy as
well.
Id. at 1393-94.
55. See Akzo, 990 F. Supp. at 905-06. The Akzo court described the action at
issue in the following manner:
Plaintiffs do not dispute defendants' characterization of the work necessary to complete construction of the [two] 125 feet long by 125 feet wide
pads ....
According to defendants' calculations, the pads alone required
about 175 15-ton truck loads of mason sand (2604 tons) and about 7,000
square yards of geofabric and PVC liner.
[The State agency] began using these pads ... when it started excavating drums from Areas 1 and 4. The excavation continued for two
weeks. The 235 drums excavated during this time were stored in "overpack" containers and placed on the pads.... They remained on the pads
for approximately 18 months while [] tests were conducted.
Id. at 901-02 (footnote omitted).
The Akzo court explained that these actions were not sufficient to trigger the
statute of limitations because they were conducted for "testing purposes" and
therefore did not play a critical role in "implementation" of the remedial action.
See id. at 905-06.
56. 890 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
57. See id. at 1042. Union Carbideinvolved an action to recover costs between
two private parties. See id. at 1039. The plaintiff, Union Carbide, executed a plan,
which Georgia's environmental agency approved, to close the landfill in question.
See id. at 1040. Union Carbide then filed a cost recovery action, under section 107
of CERCLA, which governs all actions to recover costs, against Thiokol, the previous owner of the site. See id. at 1039. Thiokol defended the action based upon the
relevant statutes of limitations See id. Thiokol attempted to characterize Union
Carbide's actions as "removal" rather than "remedial" and, therefore, asserted that
the action was subject to the three-year statute of limitations under section
113(g) (2) (A). See id. at 1042. The district court rejected this characterization and
sought to apply the six-year statute of limitations for "remedial" actions under section 113(g)(2)(B). See id. at 104142. Union Carbide, however, was unable to
prove that its action was timely, even under this longer statutory period. See id. at
1042.
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anticipation of installing the clay cap, was sufficient to trigger the
statutory period. 58 Central to the Union Carbide court's reasoning
was the fact that building the fence was listed as "the first element
of the final closure plan submitted to the [state environmental
agency] .59 Therefore, the Union Carbide court appeared comfortable deciding that the action was undertaken pursuant to the "permanent remedy," as required to trigger the statute. 60 These district
court opinions illustrate the disparity that exists between actions
courts deem sufficient to begin accrual of the statutory period and
the differing approaches used to reach those decisions.
c. Policy ConsiderationsReflected in Case Law
Courts repeatedly have construed CERCLA's statutes of limitations in favor of the government. 61 The policy underlying this general rule of construction is that the negligence of public officers,
who fail to act within the statutory period, should not prejudice the
62
public interest the statute seeks to protect.

58. See id. at 1042 ("Court can find very little guidance in determining when
physical on-site construction of a remedial action begins.").
59. Id. The Union Carbide court argued that "[e]ven if the purpose of the
fence was to keep animals out of the landfill in anticipation of installing the clay
cap, it was an 'action consistent with a permanent remedy,' 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24),
as an integral step in the final closure process." Id.
60. See id. Furthermore, the Union Carbide court noted that even if it employed the time line Union Carbide favored, it would reach the same result. See id.
Union Carbide relied upon an unadopted EPA rule which marked the "completion of the remedial design and issuance of the Notice to Proceed" as the beginning point of any remedial action under section 107. Id. The Union Carbidecourt
stressed that this unadopted rule had no "precedential value." Id. The unadopted
rule's application to this case, however, would not change the result since the
building of the fence took place after the Notice to Proceed was issued. See id.
61. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding CERCLA's statute of limitations ambiguous and therefore resorting to rule of statutory construction favoring government); Reardon v. United
States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513 (1st Cir. 1991) (allowing broad interpretation of statute
of limitations so as not to bar government's CERCLA claim); United States v. Akzo
Nobel Coatings, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 897, 907 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (construing statute
of limitations' trigger, initiation of physical on-site activity, narrowly in favor of
government); United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552, 1562-63
(D.N.M. 1992) (holding applicable statute of limitations did not begin to run until
EPA issued its Record of Decision, thus finding government's claim timely);
United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D. Ill.
1991) (stating, "[statute of limitations] must be afforded a broad and liberal construction so as to avoid limiting the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs
beyond the limits expressly provided"). For a discussion of cases where federal
courts have rejected this rule, see infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
62. See 51 Am.JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 50, n.18 (1970) (stating that
"[t]he general principle of public policy applicable to all governments, that the
public interest should not be prejudiced by the negligence or default of public
officers, underlies the rule of strict construction for statutes of limitation in gov-
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Although the Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed
the interpretation of CERCLA's statutes of limitations, the Court
has, in a variety of situations, announced the broad rule that courts
should strictly construe statutes of limitations in favor of the government.6 3 The Sixth Circuit applied this broad rule in Kelley v. E.I.

DuPont de Nemours & Co.,64 stating its "willingness to give CERCLA
provisions a broad construction, 'consistent with the legislative purposes of the act"' and thereby acknowledged that "CERCLA's limi'65
tations periods are to be broadly construed.
Several district courts have reached conclusions similar to that
of the Sixth Circuit. For example, in United States v. United Nuclear
66
Coip.,
the District Court for the District of New Mexico stated that
"[c]ourts have interpreted the [CERCLA] statute of limitations lib-

ernment cases") (citing United States v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 314
(1918)).
Courts have historically shown deference to the government in litigation matters. See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 (1990). Under the traditional
concept of sovereign immunity, courts barred private parties from bringing suit
against the government. See id. In modern times, the government has consented
to being held liable by private parties in numerous situations. See id. However,
courts construe the laws which permit such suits against the government in favor of
the government. See id. Thus, the statutory period in which the government may
be sued is also to be construed strictly. See id.; see also Holdsclaw, supra note 21, at
885-88 (explaining common law basis of rule).
63. See Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 669-70 (1996) (stating rule
of construction in action under Suits in Admirality Act); Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (citing rule as authority for allowing government to toll statute of limitations); Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386,
391 (1984) (applying rule to interpret Internal Revenue Code); United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18, 125 (1979) (applying rule to bar claim against government under Federal Tort Claims Act). For a discussion of cases where lower
federal courts have time barred a government claim, see infra notes 73-82 and
accompanying text.
64. 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. (quoting Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247
(6th Cir. 1991)). In Kelley, the State of Michigan brought a CERCLA action against
the defendants for recovery of costs incurred during the clean-up of an industrial
waste site. See id. at 837-39. Relying on the rule of construction that statutes of
limitations be interpreted in favor of the government, the district court held that
the actions at issue did not represent a separate "removal action" subject to a different limitations period. See id. at 840. The Sixth Circuit determined that the
statute of limitations was ambiguous, and therefore, upheld the district court's reliance on the rule of statutory construction. See id. at 842-44. In its liberal interpretation of the statute, the Kelley court stated that "[i]n general, the passage of an
additional year will do little to dim memories that are already almost 30 years old."
Id. at 843-44. The court's interpretation of the statute of limitations ensured that
the purpose of CERCLA, that responsible parties be liable for the prompt clean-up
of hazardous waste sites, would be achieved. See id. at 843.
66. 814 F. Supp. 1552 (D.N.M. 1992).
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erally in favor of EPA." 67 Likewise, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc.68
concluded that "the remedial intent of CERCLA requires a liberal
69
statutory construction in order to avoid frustrating its purpose."
Conversely, a competing policy favors the prompt filing of government claims under CERCLA in the interest of resolving environmental liability in a timely manner. 70 This view was most clearly
articulated in the legislative history of SARA. 71 There, Congress explicitly stated that its intention in promulgating SARA was to ensure
that cost recovery actions against responsible parties were brought
as soon as the government gathered enough information to
72
proceed.
67. Id. at 1561. In United Nuclear,EPA sought to recover clean-up costs associated with seepage of hazardous liquids from one of United Nuclear's "tailing
ponds." See id. at 1554. These ponds contained solid and liquid waste from United
Nuclear's uranium mine. See id. The government brought its action after discovering that the seepage from the ponds had contaminated various subterranean aquifers, including one which provided drinking water to some area residents. See id.
The district court concluded that EPA was engaged in a "removal" action subject to
a three year statute of limitations. See id. at 1561. The district court then held that
the limitations period would be triggered on the date EPA filed its Record of Decision. See id. at 1563. Because the government filed its claim exactly three years
after the date of filing its Record of Decision, the claim was timely. See id.
68. 824 F. Supp. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
69. Id. at 755. EPA brought an action under CERCLA to recover the costs
associated with an environmental study conducted at the defendant's site. See id. at
752. The study concluded that "the chemical contaminants at the site presented
little risk to public health and the environment" and authorized EPA to take "no
further action." Id. at 752-53. Similar to the United Nuclearcourt, the district court
in Petersen Sand held that the statute of limitations for a removal action began to
run when EPA issued its Record of Decision. See id. at 755.
70. See H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 20 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3043 (describing congressional intent behind SARA as bringing of timely
claims). For further discussion of the legislative history of SARA and a description
of Congress's intent in adopting the relevant statutes of limitations, see supra note
24 and infra note 72.
71. See id.
72. See id. The congressional report states:
The Committee believes that cost recovery and damages actions should
be brought at the most appropriate time in light of the response action
taken, and that in general these actions should be brought as early as EPA has
the necessary information to do so. Therefore, the Committee amenement
[sic] provides revised statutes of limitation for bringing natural resource
damages actions and cost recovery actions under section 107.
Id. at 3043 (emphasis added); see also H. R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79 (1985),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861. The congressional committee also
stated:
CERCLA currently includes no explicit statute of limitations for the filing
of cost recovery actions under section 107. This amendment provides for
the timely filing of cost recovery actions, to assure that evidence concerning liability and response costs is fresh and to provide a measure of finality to affected responsible parties ....
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Although not common under CERCLA, federal courts have
been willing to apply statutes of limitations against the claims of the
federal government in other contexts. 73 In United States v.
$515,060.42 in United States Currency,74 for example, the Sixth Circuit time barred the government's forfeiture action against currency seized as part of an illegal gambling operation. 75 The statute
under which the government sought forfeiture included a five-year
statute of limitations, which began to run "after the time when the
alleged offense was discovered." 76 The Sixth Circuit rejected the
government's argument that because there was a continuing violation of the gambling laws, it was permitted to seize money obtained
through recent illegal activities. 77 Further, the Sixth Circuit noted
H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 79. Furthermore, the committee added that "the
Federal government recognizes the need for filing of cost recovery actions in a
timely fashion, to assure that evidence concerning liability and response costs in
[sic] fresh, to help replenish the Fund." Id. at 2920.
73. See, e.g., United States v. $515,060.42 in United States Currency, 152 F.3d
491 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying statute of limitations to bar government's forfeiture
action); United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (applying statute of
limitations to bar criminal prosecution); United States v. Te Selle, 34 F.3d 909 (9th
Cir. 1994) (barring government's default action on scholarship because statute of
limitation expired); Lauckner v. United States, No. CIV.9301594, 1994 WL 837464
(D.N.J. May 4, 1994) (applying statute of limitations to bar government's action
against corporate officer for tax violation); FDIC v. Hinkson, 655 F. Supp 356 (D.
Del. 1987) (barring FDIC's action to recover money owned on loan); see also California v. Hyampom Lumber Co., 903 F. Supp. 1389, 1394 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (barring
State of California's cost recovery action under statute of limitations found in CERCLA section 113 (g) (2) (B)).
74. 152 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 1998).
75. See id. at 503. In $515,060.42, the government had seized money during a
federal investigation of bingo game operations in Tennessee. See id. at 495. The
government claimed that such currency was subject to forfeiture because it "was
used to commit and facilitate the commission of an illegal gambling business." Id.
The investigation began in 1988 and within that year, Internal Revenue Service
agents were able to establish that the bingo game operators engaged in illegal
activities. See id. at 496. In connection with these findings, the government obtained several convictions over the next two years. See id. Hurst, the party whose
currency the government seized, was convicted of conspiracy to conduct, and of
conducting, an illegal gambling operation in 1993. See id. at 495. The government, however, waited until 1994 to bring this forfeiture action. See id. Hurst asserted that the five-year statute of limitations began to run in 1988, when the
government first discovered his illegal activities. See id. The $515,060.42 court
agreed with Hurst's interpretation of the statute, and time barred the government's claim. See id. at 503.
76. Id. at 502 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1621, made applicable to forfeiture proceedings by 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d)). The statute under which the defendants were
convicted, provides in pertinent part: "[a]ny property, including money, used in
violation of the provisions of this section may be seized and forfeited to the United
States." Id. at 501 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d)).
77. See id. at 502-03. The Sixth Circuit held that "[t] he statute of limitations
does not run from the date of a particular violation, but from the date of 'discovery' of an offense." Id. at 502 (citing United States v. Complex Mach. Works Co.,
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that "[s]tatutes of limitation are statutes of repose representing 'a
pervasive legislative judgment that it is unjust to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified period . . .' [and
such] notice would be undermined in this case if the Government
78
was allowed to prosecute its action."
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit barred a government claim because the claim violated the relevant statute of limitations in United
States v. Te Selle.79 The Te Selle court refused to interpret the limitations period as beginning "when the government learned of the dismissal of its first complaint" in lieu of the statute's plain meaning,
which established the act of dismissal itself as the triggering event.8 0
The Ninth Circuit stated that "this court takes a dim view of the sort
of 'tolling' claim urged by the government .... The government
did not exercise diligence in this case .... There thus is no cause
for tolling the limitations period beyond the time set forth in [the
statute]."81 Thus, federal courts are willing to time bar the government's claims, even in the face of a reasonable interpretation of the
statute which would permit such a claim, if they determine that policy interests in favor of prompt action outweigh the government's
82
interest in enforcing the law.
937 F. Supp. 943, 944 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996)). Therefore, since the discovery of
the violation occurred in 1988, the action brought in 1994 was not timely. See id. at
503.
78. Id. at 503 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)).
79. 34 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 1994). In Te Selle, the government brought a default
action against a recipient of a National Health Service Corps scholarship. See id. at
909. As a condition of receipt of the scholarship, Ms. Te Selle was obligated to
provide two years of service in a "health manpower shortage area." Id. at 909-10.
She failed to do this and the government sought to reclaim the value of the scholarship through a default action. See id. at 909.
80. See id. at 910. The government first notified Ms. Te Selle that she was in
default of her scholarship in 1984. See id. The government filed suit to recover the
debt in late 1989. See id. In 1991, however, the district court dismissed this claim
for failure to prosecute. See id. However, the district court clerk did not mail the
notice of dismissal to either party, and it was some time before the parties learned
of the court's action. See id. Following receipt of notification, the government
refiled the charge. See id. Due to the delay in notification, Ms. Te Selle was able to
successfully argue that the statute of limitations for such action had lapsed. See id.
81. Id. at 910-11. The court emphasized that public policy dictates that each
party has an independent duty to keep informed of the case disposition, regardless
of the negligence of public employees in failing to facilitate access to information.
See id.
82. See $515,060.42, 152 F.3d at 503 (stating that "purpose of the statute of
limitation's notice [requirement] would be undermined ...if the Government was
allowed to prosecute its action"); United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 177 (noting compelling interests favoring statute of limitations defense as protection
"against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of
time").
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FACTS

The hazardous waste site at issue in Navistar was a municipal
landfill, in use from approximately 1967, until it was closed in
1976.83 In 1986, EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List
of areas "presenting the greatest danger to public health or welfare
or the environment." 84 Pursuant to this action, EPA evaluated the
site's potential harm and formulated a plan to remedy the environ85
mental danger.
In February of 1989, the United States and the State of Indiana
(the governments) filed complaints against SCA Services of Indi86
ana, Inc. (SCA), the then current owner and operator of the site.
The governments sought to recover response costs incurred, and to
be incurred, in conducting the remedial action.8 7 Shortly after the
action was filed, however, the governments and SCA entered into a

83. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 704. The site giving rise to this litigation, the Fort
Wayne Reduction Site, is located on the Maumee River in Fort Wayne, Indiana. See
id. The site was used as a municipal land fill from approximately 1967 until June
1976. See id. The governments asserted that during this time frame, a number of
hazardous substances were disposed of at the site, including residential and industrial waste. See id.
84. CERCLA § 105 (a) (8), 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (a) (8). The site was placed on the
National Priorities List on June 10, 1986. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., No.
CIV.1:89cv29, 1995 WL 569634 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 1995).
The National Priorities List (NPL) is a compilation of hazardous waste sites,
which pose the greatest threats to public health and require a long-term response.
See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 8.7 (C) (1992). In 1990, there were 1,246 sites on the NPL. See id. The
list is meant to be informative and serve management needs. See id. Inclusion on
the list does not require EPA to act or assign liability to any party. See id. However,
as a practical matter, most of the sites which EPA does select for clean-up are on
the NPL. See id.
85. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 704 (citing Environmental Protection Agency, 40
C.F.R. §§ 300.400-440 (1997) (describing methods and criteria for evaluating, prioritizing and remedying environmental threats)). In conformity with these rules,
EPA completed its Remedial Investigation Report concerning the Fort Wayne site
on June 10, 1986. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., No. CIV.1:89cv29, 1995 WL
569634, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 1995). On August 26, 1988, EPA issued a Record
of Decision describing the course of action necessary to clean-up the site. See id.
Included in this process was the construction of a "clay cap" which would cover the
site and prevent the spread of hazardous material to the surrounding environment. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 704.
86. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 704.
87. See id. CERCLA imposes strict liability on persons within four categories:
1) current owners or operators of the facility where hazardous waste has been disposed; 2) owners and operators of the facility at the time of disposal; 3) transporters of a hazardous substance; and 4) those who arranged for disposal at the facility.
See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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consent decree which provided that SCA would pay for and perform the necessary remedial action. 88
On September 11, 1992, SCA filed a third-party complaint for
contribution against numerous other potentially responsible parties, including Navistar, for the cost of the cleanup.8 9 The governments did not assert any claims against the third-party defendants,
nor did the third-party defendants present any claims against the
governments.9" In fact, the governments unsuccessfully sought severance of the third-party actions from their litigation with SCA. 9 1
SCA eventually resolved its claims against the third-party defendants
through multiple settlement agreements to which the governments
92
were not a party.
These settlement agreements could have been construed as
precluding future actions against the third-party defendants concerning their liability for the clean-up, including actions brought by
88. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (N.D. Ind.
1994). The United States filed the proposed Consent Decree with the district
court on February 22, 1989, the same day that the United States filed its complaint
against SCA. See id. at 1267-68. SCA had already accepted the terms of this Consent Decree several weeks earlier, on October 3, 1988. See id. at 1268. The District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana entered the Consent Decree on July 18,
1989. See id. The Consent Decree provided that SCA would carry out the remedial
measures outlined in EPA's Record of Decision, as well as make periodic payments
to the government as reimbursement for oversight costs. See id. The cost of the
clean-up, pursuant to EPA's directives, was estimated at over $15 million. See id.
For a more complete discussion of the use of consent decrees in CERCLA
actions, see Annotation, Government Recovery of Cost of Hazardous Waste Removal
Under Comprehensive EnvironmentalResponse Compensation, and Liability Act, 70 A.L.R.
FED. 329 (1998).
89. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., 849 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (N.D. Ind.
1994). SCA filed its third-party complaint against over fifty potentially liable parties on September 11, 1992. See id. Later, SCA amended its third-party complaint
and asserted claims for both contribution under section 113(g) (2) and cost recovery under section 107 of CERCLA. See SCA Servs., 849 F. Supp. at 1268-69. The
third-party defendants asserted that SCA was barred by section 113(g)(2)'s three
year statute of limitations, and that there was no private right to recovery costs
under section 107(a). See id. at 1269. The district court agreed with the third-party
defendants regarding the section 113 contribution claim, but allowed SCA to pursue its claim for cost recovery under section 107. See id. at 1284.
90. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705.
91. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., 150 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ind. 1993). The
governments posited that "it should be granted severance because it has no claims
or controversy with the Third-Party Defendants and the Third-Party Defendants
have no claims against the government." Id. at 145. The district court did not
grant the severance because of the discovery difficulties that the third-party defendants would face if the government were not a party to the action. See id. at 14647.
92. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 705; see also United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., 827
F. Supp. 526 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (discussing liability of settling parties and rights of
non-settling parties regarding agreement reached between fourteen third-party defendants and SCA).
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the governments. 93 Thus, the governments sought a declaratory order from the district court preserving their right to bring future
actions against the third-party defendants. 94 The United States
filed for a declaratory order on September 19, 1996; the State of
95
Indiana filed a claim on September 20, 1996.
The third-party defendants asserted that CERCLA's six-year
statute of limitations for recovery of costs from initial remedial actions time barred the governments' claims. 96 They argued that the
statute began to run on September 18, 1990, or earlier, when workers placed the first layer of clay upon the site to build the "clay cap"
EPA required. 97 Thus, the third-party defendants asserted that the
governments failed to bring suit before the statute of limitations
expired - the United States by one day, the State of Indiana by two
98
days.
The district court declined to accept the third-party defendants' interpretation of the statute of limitations, holding that the
governments' claims were not time barred, and thereby denying the
defendants' motion for summary judgment. 99 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's holding, basing its decision upon the
plain meaning of the statute.10 0 The Seventh Circuit held that operation of the statute of limitations time barred the governments'
cost recovery claims. 10 '

93. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705.
94. See id.; see also CERCLA § 113(g) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (2) (B) (providing "[i]n any... [cost recovery] action described in this subsection, the court
shall enter a declaratory judgment on liability for response costs or damages").
95. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 705. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit's
resolution of the state claim, see infra note 102.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 711. Navistar also pointed to a number of other actions, prior to
the construction of the clay cap, which might have triggered the statutory period.
See id. Among these actions were the hook up of utilities at the site, the set up of
trailers at the site, construction of an access road and preparations made to the
landfill for the clay cap. See id. Because the Navistarcourt determined that construction of the clay cap triggered the statutory period, it refrained from addressing whether any of these earlier actions would also have been sufficient. See id. at
713.
For a more complete discussion of activities which other courts have deemed
sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, see supranotes 44-60 and accompanying text.
98. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 713.
99. See id. at 706.
100. See id. at 714. For a narrative analysis of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning,
see infra notes 102-35 and accompanying text. For a critical analysis of the Seventh
Circuit's opinion, see infra notes 13649 and accompanying text.
101. See id.
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NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

At the outset of its discussion in Navistar, the Seventh Circuit
framed the two precise issues to be addressed in the appeal. First,
the Seventh Circuit needed to determine "[w]hether the six-year
statute of limitations for 'initial actions' or the open-ended statute
of limitations for 'subsequent actions' .. ." applied to this case. Sec-

ond, the Seventh Circuit stated that if the six-year statute of limitations for initial actions was applicable, then it must address
"whether the governments' actions were filed more than six years
following the [start of the statutory period] ."102
The governments urged the court to interpret the statute of
limitations in the interest of furthering Congress's goals. 10 3 As the
Navistarcourt noted, the Supreme Court previously articulated the
rule: "statutes of limitation sought to be applied .

.

. [against] the

Government[ ] must receive a strict construction in favor of the
Government."1 0 4 Although the Navistar court recognized the exist102. Id. at 706-07. In addition, the Navistarcourt addressed state law claims
made by the State of Indiana under a statute substantially similar to CERCLA. See
id. at 713-14. For the state statute under which Indiana brought its claim, see IND.
CODE § 13-25-4-8 (West 1990). The state law does not include any statute of limitations. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 713. Therefore, Indiana argued that the state's
default statute of limitations, ten years, should apply in the absence of a specific
period. See id. at 713-14. The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the Indiana
statute expressly established liability "in the same manner and to the same extent"
as CERCLA. Id. (quoting IND. CODE § 13-254-8 (West 1990)). Thus, CERCLA's
statute of limitations, which limits the extent of liability, was adopted by the state
statute. See id. As a result of this determination, the Navistar court was able to
apply the same reasoning applied under the federal claim to resolve the state law
action. See id.
103. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 707; see also Kelley v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours &
Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding CERCLA's statute of limitations
under section 1 13(g) (2) (A) ambiguous, justifing construction in government's
favor); Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1519 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating
courts should broadly construe CERCLA's statute of limitations because "running
of the statute of limitations is entirely within the EPA's control.... [T] he government may take its own sweet time before suing ..

. .");

United States v. United

Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552, 1561 (D.N.M. 1992) (discussing courts' liberal
interpretation of CERCLA's statute of limitations in EPA's favor); United States v.
Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D. I11.1991) (stating that
.remedial intent of CERCLA requires a liberal statutory construction in order to
avoid frustrating its purpose"). But see New Castle County v. Halliburton Nus
Corp., 903 F. Supp. 771, 780 (D. Del. 1995) (displaying court's willingness to
strictly construe statute of limitations for contribution claims against private
parties).
104. Navistar, 152 F.3d at 707 n.5 (citing Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464
U.S. 386, 391 (1984)); see also E.I Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 246 U.S. 456,
462 (1924) (holding statutes of limitations must receive strict construction when
applied against government); Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249
(1930) (stating "general rule [that] a statute of limitation runs against the United
States only when they [sic] assent"); Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 570
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ence of this rule of statutory construction, the court instead placed
greater emphasis on Congress's intention that the government
bring CERCLA suits in a prompt and timely manner. 10 5 The Seventh Circuit therefore declined to give special deference to the gov10 6
ernments' interpretation of the statute.
A.

Which Statute of Limitations Should Apply?

The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the relevant statutes
of limitations found in section l1 3 (g) (2) (B) of CERCLA.10 7 This
section includes two different periods of limitations for remedial
cost recovery actions brought by the government. The first statutory period provides that claimants must bring "initial" actions
within six years after the beginning of the clean-up; the second
states that claimants must bring "subsequent" actions either during
10 8 The Navisthe clean-up or within three years of its completion.
tar court, therefore, had to determine whether the governments'
September 1996 claims were "initial" or "subsequent" within the
meaning of CERCLA.10 9
In addressing this issue, the Seventh Circuit declined to follow
the line of cases which held that a declaratory judgment against a
party is a prerequisite for any "subsequent" action against that same
party. 1 10 Although CERCLA states that any action against a party
(1973) (noting "as a matter of Constitutional law" Congress has plenary power
over statutes of limitations). For a more complete discussion of the policy reasons
for construing statutes of limitations strictly in favor of the government, see supra
notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
105. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 707. The Navistar court also relied upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts Operations,
which held that "statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. On the contrary, they have long been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system." Id. at 707 (citing 78 F.3d 1164, 1165 (7th Cir. 1996)); see alsoUnited States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (recognizing importance of statutes of limitations and applying statute to bar claim of private party against government); Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996)
(discussing useful functions of statutes of limitations in context of Title VII sexual
harassment suit).
106. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 707-08. For a critical analysis of this decision by
the Navistar court, see infra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
107. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 708. For the text of section 113(g) (2) (B), see
supra notes 31-33.
108. See CERCLA § 113(g) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (2) (B). For the rele3
vant text of section l1 (g) (2) (B), see supra notes 31-33.
109. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 707-10.
110. See id. The Seventh Circuit adopted the "common sense" approach to
the term "subsequent" without providing any authority for its position. See id. The
Navistar court distinguished both the Beazer East and Kelley opinions. See id. Perhaps, in reaching this decision, the Navistar court relied on the interpretation of
CERCLA provided by the District Court for the District of New Hampshire in
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with a declaratory judgment entered against it will be "subsequent,"
the Navistarcourt noted that "there is nothing to indicate that the
entry of such a declaratory judgement is a prerequisiteto the prosecution of a 'subsequent action . . . for further response costs."""

Thus, the Seventh Circuit refused to characterize the governments'
claims as "initial" solely because the governments had not previously obtained a declaratory judgment against Navistar regarding
1 12
the clean-up.
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the governments' contention
that the action filed against SCA in February 1989 was the "initial
action" that established liability regarding the site.1 13 Thus, the
government argued, any later suits concerning liability for the site
would necessarily be "subsequent."1' 14 Under this interpretation, it
was insignificant that the governments did not specifically name
Navistar or the other potentially liable parties as defendants in the

United States v. Mottolo, 107 F.R.D. 267 (D.N.H. 1985). The Mottolo court held that a

party may amend its CERCLA action for future response costs to include a declaratory order as to liability. See Mottolo, 107 F.R.D. at 269. The Mottolo court rejected
the argument that under sections 111 and 112, a party must first establish liability
by obtaining a declaratory order, then, in a later proceeding, seek recovery of
costs. See id. at 268-69. The district court claimed that such an interpretation
would violate the doctrine against claim-splitting. See id. at 268. The Mottolo case,
however, was decided in 1985, before Congress enacted SARA. See id. at 267. The
enactment of SARA, including section 113, has been interpreted as limiting the
rule set forth in Mottolo. See Daniel Riesel, Overview of SARA's Impact Upon the Law of
Hazardous Substance, in ENVrL. LITIG. 741, 761 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, June
1988) (stating "courts may enter declaratory judgments on liability which are binding in subsequent actions to recover additional response costs. Thus, Section
113(g)(2) limits the contrary rule in U.S. v. Mottolo"). Thus, this holding of the
Navistar court appears to be in disagreement with currentjurisprudence. See Warshauer, supra note 35.
For a discussion of the reasoning employed by the courts which hold that a
declaratory judgment against a party is a prerequisite to a subsequent action
against that party, see supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
111. Navistar, 152 F.3d at 710 (quoting CERCLA § 1 13 (g)(2), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(g) (2)). The Seventh Circuit stated that "the intent of Congress in including the sentence was to avoid the necessity of relitigating liability questions." Id. at
709. In Navistar, however, the court had not held Navistar or the other third-party
defendants liable for any of the response costs in the action against SCA. See id.
Thus, the Navistar court found no policy reason to require a declaratory order in
the case. See id.
112. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 710. However, this part of the Navistar court's
holding is arguably dicta, since the court concluded that the governments' claims
were for "initial actions" under its "common-sense" approach. See id. at 708-10.
113. See id. at 710. The governments argued that the "initial" action regarding the site was against SCA. See id. at 708. Therefore, the governments urged that
the second trial against Navistar was a "subsequent" action as to liability for the
clean-up. See id.
114. See id. at 708.
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litigation with SCA. 115 The governments also noted that although
Navistar was not a defendant in the action against SCA, Navistar was
a third-party to the litigation, and was on notice that the govern16
ments intended to bring claims against it at a later date."
This reasoning, however, did not persuade the Seventh Circuit,
which instead adopted the "common sense" approach to the statutory language. 17 The Navistarcourt concluded that an "initial action" under CERCLA referred to the first suit brought against a
particular party and that any later suits brought against that same
party were "subsequent actions.""" In support of this construction,
the Seventh Circuit noted that it was the only plausible interpretation of Congress's intent in drafting the statute of limitations.1 19
Conversely, if the governments' construction was to control, the
government need only bring suit against one potentially liable party
regarding a clean-up, and thereafter it could sue any other potentially liable party at any time during the clean-up, or within three
years after completion of the clean-up. 120 Since environmental
clean-ups often take decades to complete, such a holding "would
largely write the limitations restriction for initial actions out of the
statute."' 2 ' The Seventh Circuit therefore held that the six-year
statute of limitations for initial remedial actions applied to the
22
case.1

115. See id.
116. See id. at 710. There was evidence that EPA notified the third-party defendants through letters that they might incur liability regarding the site as early as
1988. See United States v. SCA Servs., Inc., No. CIV.1:89cv29, 1995 WL 569634, at
*3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 1995).
117. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 708-10.
118. See id. at 710. The Navistarcourtstated that "[t]he first time an action is
brought against a given party, it cannot be anything other than an 'initial action'
... [and] that a 'subsequent action' against a party can be brought only after an
'initial action' has been brought against it." Id.
119. See id. In making this determination, the court relied on CERCLA's legislative history which demonstrated Congress's desire to promote prompt government claims and to protect defendants from stale claims. See id.; see also H.R. REP.
No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 138 (1985), reprinted in 1986 at U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2920 (stating purpose of CERCLA's statute of limitations is "to provide some measure of
finality to affected responsible parties").
120. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 710.
121. Id. The Navistar court noted that the clean-up at issue in the case would
probably continue for at least thirty more years. See id. Thus, under the governments' interpretation, they would still have over three decades in which to bring
suit against Navistar. See id. The court inferred that such a result was not Congress's intention in adding the statutes of limitations. See id.
122. See id. at 710.
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Were the Governments' Claims Filed Within
the Six Year Statutory Period?

After concluding that the six-year statute of limitations applied
to the case, the Navistarcourt turned to the question of whether the
governments' claims were filed within that period. 123 The statute
provides that the government has six years to bring a claim "after
initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action
.... 124 Although CERCLA defines "remedial action," it leaves the
125
other terms in the statute of limitations undefined.
The Seventh Circuit agreed with Navistar's assertion that the
statute was triggered on September 18, 1990, when the first lift of
clay for the clay cap was placed upon the landfill. 126 In support of
this ruling, the Seventh Circuit noted that CERCLA specifically
mentions a "clay cover" as among those actions which are considered "remedial."' 27 In addition, the Navistarcourt relied upon the
plain meaning of the other terms within the statute, as well as the
128
Hyampom Lumber decision for further support.
The Seventh Circuit rejected the governments' argument that
"remedial action" is a term of art including only those actions taken
pursuant to a final remedial design which EPA has approved in writing. 129 Such a holding, the governments argued, would establish a

123. See id. at 711-13.
124. Id. at 711. For the text of section 113(g) (2) (B), see supra note 32.
125. See CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). For the text of section
101 (24), defining a remedial action, see supra note 30.
126. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 713. In addition, Navistar argued that actions
which workers performed at the site earlier than September 18, 1990 might also
have triggered the statute. See id. at 705. The Seventh Circuit declined to rule on
whether these actions were sufficient to trigger the statute, since it concluded that
the governments' claims were time barred by initiation of the clay cap construction. See id. at 713 n.19.
127. See id. at 711. For the text of section 101 (24), see supra note 30.
128. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 712-13; see also California v. Hyampon Lumber
Co., 903 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (holding installation of utilities "remedial"
and marked "initiation" of permanent remedy, triggering statute of limitations);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (holding
building of steel fence to keep animals from site constituted physical on-site construction for statute of limitations purposes). But see United States v. Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 897 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (concluding extensive work on
site, including hookup of utilities and fencing of site, did not trigger statutory
period).
129. See id. at 711-12. It was this argument by the governments which the
dissenting judge also believed should prevail. See id. at 715. For a discussion in
favor of this argument, see infta notes 140-49 and accompanying text.
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bright line rule for future courts to easily apply. 13 0 The majority of
the Navistarcourt, however, could find no support for this interpretation in the wording or structure of CERCLA. 13 1 Furthermore, the
Navistar court declined to accept the governments' assertion that
an act which initiates the remedial action must play a "critical role
in [the] implementation of the permanent remedy."1 32 The governments claimed that the court could not consider the lift of clay
placed upon the site on September 18, 1990, a "critical" part of the
permanent remedy triggering the statute because its initial con133
struction was defective and the job had to be corrected.
Although the governments cited judicial precedents and portions
of CERCLA's legislative history to lend credibility to their position,
the Seventh Circuit focused exclusively on the plain meaning of the
statute. 13 4 Thus, the Navistar court held that the actions on September 18, 1990, "clearly" triggered the six-year statutory period,
and thereby barred the governments' claims made more than six
13 5
years after that date.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

A. The Seventh Circuit Carelessly Abandoned the Policy that
Courts Strictly Construe Statutes of Limitations in the
Government's Favor.
In reaching its holding, the Seventh Circuit failed to give substantial weight to the policy rule that courts should construe stat130. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 711. For a further discussion of the impact that
may have occurred had the Navistarcourt adopted the governments' position, see
infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
131. See id. at 711-12. The Navistar majority held that if Congress had intended the final decision to mark the point at which a remedial action may begin,
it would have said so clearly. See id. at 712. In the absence of such a clear statement by Congress, the Seventh Circuit was unwilling to write such a provision into
the statute based upon the overall structure of CERCIA or in the interest ofjudicial economy. See id.
The Navistardissent, however, presented a strong argument in favor of this
statutory interpretation. See id. at 715. The dissent was particularly fond of the
governments' argument because of the ease at which it could be applied. See id.
132. Id. at 712-13. For a discussion of the Akzo case, where the district court
did apply the "critical role" requirement, see supra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text.
133. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 713. The court explained that the initial layer of
clay which workers applied on September 18, 1990, did not comply with the relevant standards, and its construction was halted because it could not be completed
before winter. See id. at 713 n.18.
134. See id. The Seventh Circuit stated, "we do not consider that fact [that the
clay cap was inadequate] relevant because the statute does not indicate that the
initial construction must be successful." Id.
135. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 713.
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utes of limitations in favor of allowing the government's claims to
proceed.136 The authority which the Navistar court cited in support

of its decision was dubious. The Navistar court relied upon two
broad statements from SARA's legislative history, and improperly
analogized cases in which courts applied, or refused to apply, statutes of limitations against private parties.137 Thus, the Seventh Circuit conducted the remainder of its analysis without the usual
deference courts accord to the government. 138 This lack of defer136. See id. at 707-08. The Navistar court acknowledged the existence of the
general principle that courts are to construe statutes of limitations in the government's favor. See id. at 707. However, due to Congress's "specific purpose" in adding this statute of limitations to CERCLA through amendment, the Seventh
Circuit refused to apply the rule unless faced with ambiguity. See id. The Seventh
Circuit found no ambiguities. See id.; see also California v. Hyampom Lumber Co.,
903 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (applying CERCLA's statute of limitations to
bar State of California's claim). But see Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17
F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding CERCLA's statutes of limitations for cost recovery ambiguous and construing issue in government's favor).
137. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 707 n.7. The Seventh Circuit directly relied
upon New Castle County v. HalliburtonNUS Corp. See id. In New Castle, the dispute

concerned applying CERCLA's statute of limitations against a privateparty. See New
Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1119-20 (3d Cir. 1997).
Likewise, the Navistar court's reliance on Galloway v. General Motors Service Parts

Operations,a case between two private entities, was also misplaced. See Galloway, 78
F.3d 1164 (7th Cir. 1996). The portion of the Galloway opinion which the Navistar
court quoted concerned two Supreme Court cases in which the Court found the
claim of a privateperson against the government to be time barred. See Galloway, 78
F.3d at 1165. Through its reliance on cases where the statute of limitations was
applied against private parties, the Navistar court ignored the special interest in
construing statutes of limitations in favor of the government. See Navistar, 152 F.3d
at 707 n.7; see also Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980) (barring
private plaintiff's civil rights action against State of New York); United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (enforcing statute of limitations to bar private plaintiffs action against United States under Federal Tort Claims Act).
138. See, e.g., United States v. United Nuclear Corp., 814 F. Supp. 1552
(D.N.M. 1992) (stating "[c]ourts have interpreted the statute of limitations liberally in favor of EPA"); California v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507, 1513
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating court should interpret statutes of limitations in favor of
government); Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842-43 (6th
Cir. 1994) (concluding liberal reading of statute of limitations in government's
favor warranted); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Eneco, Inc., 9 F.3d 524, 529 (6th Cir.
1993) (holding that absent specific congressional intent to contrary, courts cannot
interpret CERCLA's statute of limitations to impede CERCIA's goals); Reardon v.
United States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1519 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating "running of the statute
of limitations is entirely within the EPA's control"); United States v. Akzo Nobel
Coatings, Inc. 990 F. Supp. 897, 904 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (stating CERCLA's statute
of limitations "should be interpreted with the United States Supreme Court's frequent admonition to strictly construe statutes of limitation in favor of the Government"); United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D.
Ill. 1991) (noting that both rule of construction and remedial nature of CERCLA
provide that statute of limitations should be construed in favor of government);
United States v. Moore, 698 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Va. 1988) (stating "statutes of
limitations sought to be applied to bar rights of the Government must be strictly
construed in favor of the Government").
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ence may have lead the Navistarcourt to decide to time bar a CERCLA cost recovery action brought by the United States
39
government. 1
B.

The Governments' Assertion of the Bright Line Rule for
Triggering the Limitations Period was a Proper
Interpretation of Section 113(g) (2).

The Seventh Circuit ignored a reasonable and useful interpretation of the statute of limitations when it rejected the governments' contention that the date upon which "EPA issues final,
written approval of the remedial design for the site at issue" marks
the beginning of the remedial action. 140 Section 101 of CERCLA
defines "remedial actions" as "those actions consistent with the permanent remedy."1 41 Further, a House Judiciary Committee report states
that the statute of limitations begins to accrue with "commencement of physical on-site construction of the remedial action, that is,
after the R[emedial]I[nvestigation]/F[easibility]S[tudy]and
after design of
the remedy." 14 2 It appears, therefore, that Congress intended the
statute of limitations to begin, not simply with the initiation of any
remedial action, but only with those remedial actions that EPA's
1 43
administrative process fully approved.
139. For a more complete discussion ofjudicial action in this area of law prior
to the Navistar decision, see supra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
140. Navistar, 152 F.3d at 711-12 (rejecting governments' bright line rule argument). In his dissenting opinion, Judge Evans argued that the court should
have established final, written approval of the design as a requirement for the remedial action. See id. at 715 (Evans, J., dissenting).
141. CERCLA § 101 (24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (emphasis added). For the
text of section 101 (24), see supra note 30.
142. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1 (1986) (emphasis added). Further, in a proposed, but unadopted rule, EPA also appeared to require some form of written
approval of an action before it would be considered part of the "remedial" action.
See 57 C.F.R. §§ 34742, 34752(b) (1992). The proposed EPA rule stated that "[t]he
term 'physical on-site construction' for remedial actions is limited to actions that
occur after completion of the remedial design and issuance of the Notice to Proceed on which remedial action personnel are authorized to begin remedial construction activities." Id. But see Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F.
Supp. 1035, 1042 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (rejecting argument based upon proposed rule
and noting rule has no precedential value).
143. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 711-12 (explaining governments' argument in
support of claim). The governments asserted that "remedial action" was a term of
art "which refers to the specific action determined to be required as a result of the
evaluative administrative process." Id. Under this view, the issuance of written approval of the final design might not necessarily mark the beginning of the statutory
period for remedial actions, but no action taken prior to this point would act to
trigger the statute of limitations. See id. at 712. Actions taken after issuance of
written approval of the final design, so long as pursuant to EPA directives, would
trigger the statute. See id.
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This interpretation of the statute of limitations gains additional
support from a line of cases which distinguish between "removal
actions" and "remedial actions." 144 These cases note that "[a] removal action is a short-term, temporary response to a release or
threatened release, while a remedial action is a long-term, more
thoroughly researched and planned permanent remedy to a release
or threatened release. ' 145 Courts adopting this view reason that re14 6
moval actions and remedial actions are mutually exclusive.
Based upon case law and EPA literature, removal actions are completed "with the signature of the EPA decision. 1 1 47 Any action

taken after that date would be termed a remedial action. Thus, the
statute of limitations for a remedial action cannot begin to accrue
until the administrative process ends. 148 In light of the policies and
equities involved in CERCLA litigation, the Seventh Circuit should
have adopted this analysis and held that the actions in this case
were not sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations for recovery
actions. 149

144. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Thiokol Corp., 890 F. Supp. 1035, 1041
(S.D. Ga. 1994) (describing removal actions and remedial actions as mutually exclusive); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1117 (D.
Minn. 1982) (stating CERCLA provides two types of response actions and provides
separate definitions of each).
145. Union Carbide, 890 F. Supp. at 1041; see also Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at
1117 (stating " [ g] enerally, removal actions are short term clean up actions while
remedial actions contemplate a long term approach consistent with a permanent
remedy") (citing Environmental Defense Fund v. Gorsuch, Civ. No. 81-2083, slip
op. at 2 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1982)).
146. See Union Carbide, 890 F. Supp. at 1042 (stating CERCLA clean-ups "must
be defined as either a removal or remedial action" (emphasis added)). But see
California v. Hyampom Lumber Co., 903 F. Supp. 1389, 1393 (E.D. Cal. 1995)
(stating "court need not address the question of whether 'removal' and 'remedial'
actions are mutually exclusive").
147. United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 751, 754
(N.D. IlI. 1991). The Petersen Sand court referred to EPA's "Superfund Program
Management Manual" as support for the court's holding. See id. For a discussion
of the Petersen Sand case, see supranote 69. See also Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1118
(adopting view that remedial and removal actions are mutually exclusive). In Reilly
Tar, the United States, the State of Minnesota and two municipalities brought actions under CERCLA against the owners of a coal refinery. See id. at 1105. The
plaintiffs alleged that as a result of conduct at the refinery, hazardous substances
capable of severe harm to human health contaminated the area groundwater. See
id. 1105-06.
148. See Navistar,152 F.3d at 712 (stating governments' contention that "initiation of construction of the 'remedial action' can never begin, within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (2) (B), until the EPA issues, final, written approval of the
remedial design for the site at issue").
149. For a discussion of the advantages to the governments' proposed bright
line rule, see supra notes 151-63 and accompanying text.
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IMPACT

The Seventh Circuit forfeited an opportunity to both enforce
the goals of CERCLA, as well as provide greater certainty in a troubled area of law. 150 Contrary to the majority of cases addressing
similar issues, the Navistarcourt chose not to follow the policy rule
of strictly construing statutes of limitations in favor of the government. 15 1 This led the Seventh Circuit to reject a plausible reading
of the statute, specifically, that a remedial action cannot begin until
EPA issues final, written approval of the action. 152 If the Navistar
court had adopted this interpretation, it would have promoted the
purposes of CERCLA, lent certainty to the meaning of the law and
153
advanced judicial economy.
Congress enacted CERCLA in the interest of accomplishing
two broad goals. First, Congress sought to provide the government
with the tools necessary to promptly respond to, and clean-up, hazardous waste disposal sites which endangered public health.' 54 Second, Congress strove to ensure that those responsible for the
contamination of the environment would be held accountable for
the cost of clean-ups' 5 5 As Judge Evans noted in his dissenting
opinion in Navistar,the majority opinion impairs, rather than promotes, these goals. 15 6 At the price of only one day, the Seventh
150. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 715 (Evans, J., dissenting) (stressing that majority in Navistar ignored strong policy interests in favor of governments' argument).
151. See id. at 714. For examples of court decisions strictly construing CERCLA's statutes of limitations in the government's favor, see supra note 138. For
examples of court decisions applying a statute of limitation against the government
in other contexts, see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
152. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 711-13.
153. See id. at 715 (Evans,J, dissenting) (stressing advantages of governments'
argument).
154. See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111
(D. Minn. 1982) (stating that "[b]oth the House and Senate Committee Reports
express the need for prompt action, concern over inadequacies in existing legislation, and detail the magnitude of the problems caused by hazardous waste disposal
in this country") (citing S. Rm. No. 96-848 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 96-1016 (1980)).
155. See Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420
(7th Cir. 1994) (stating "Congress intended that those responsible for the
problems caused by the disposal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful conditions they created").
156. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 715 (Evans, J., dissenting). Judge Evans reasoned that:
As a result of the Navistar [opinion,] [p]arties will now invest time, energy, and money in what is ultimately an issue peripheral to the real question-liability. The resulting distraction will undermine CERCLA's
primary purposes: To provide a safe and efficient means of cleaning hazardous waste sites as quickly as possible, and to recover from those responsible the money spent to pay for the cleanup.
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Circuit has mandated that the governments, rather than the re157
sponsible parties, bear the cost of a multi-million dollar clean-up.
The Sixth Circuit noted, in its decision to construe CERCLA's statute of limitations in favor of the government, that "the passage of
an additional year will do little to dim memories that are already
almost 30 years old. ' 158 If the Seventh Circuit had adopted similar

reasoning, it may have correctly concluded that "the passage of an
1 59
additional day will do little to dim memories already 6 years old."
The benefit which the Navistar court secured for the defendants,
namely the right to be protected from a claim which has become
stale by only 24 hours, seems negligible when compared to the cost
160
society will pay to preserve that right.
In its zealous adherance to the statute's plain meaning, the
Seventh Circuit rejected an interpretation that would promote both
judicial economy and certainty in CERCIA litigation.1 6 1 If the governments' interpretation, that a "remedial action" begins upon the
issuance of EPA's final decision, had prevailed, courts and private
62
parties could easily establish the span of the statutory period.'
Long litigation battles concerning whether a particular event was
sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations, as illustrated by the

Navistarcase itself, would be unnecessary.1 63 The Seventh Circuit's
157. See id. (Evans, J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]oday, the court holds that
this major CERCLA suit, filed on September 19 rather than September 18 of 1996,
cannot proceed").
158. Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 843-44 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding state government's CERCLA claim not time barred). For a more
complete discussion of the Kelley opinion, see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying
text.
159. For a description of the time line concerning the Fort Wayne landfill,
and when the potentially liable parties became aware of the possibility of such
liability, see supra notes 83-95 and accompanying text.
160. See Navistar, 152 F.3d at 715 (Evans, J., dissenting) (expressing view that
majority allowed Navistar to escape liability simply because of "twenty-four little
hours").
161. See id.
162. See id. (Evans, J., dissenting). The dissent urged that the written approval
of the final design marked the genesis of remedial measures in stating the
following:
Tying the statute of limitations to the date of written approval of the remedial design plan provides a concrete basis upon which federal, state,
and private parties can rely in determining when the statute of limitations
will bar a claim. It will also be easy for district courts to apply the rule.
District judges will not have to engage in a complex weighing of factors to
determine whether particular actions advanced the purpose of the
remediation, and they will not have to guess what was in the minds of the
actors on site when certain actions were taken.
Id.
163. See id. (Evans, J., dissenting).
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opinion further complicates an already complex area of law, and, in
so doing, diverts attention from CERCLA's purpose: to ensure that
persons responsible for the contamination of the environment undertake or pay for the prompt clean-up of hazardous waste sites.
Brock Elliot Czeschin
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